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1 Migration, Remittances and Economic Development 
Migrant remittances are now very big business. In addition to the $72.3 billion worth of funds 
which Rathore (2003) estimates were transferred through formal banking channels in 2001, 
there are good reasons to suppose that funds worth at least as much again passed through 
more informal channels such as IVTS and hawala. No matter what form their mode of 
delivery may be, the arrival of these asset transfers have far reaching economic consequences 
at their destinations in the developing world, since their value is now many times greater than 
that delivered by formal development aid. Moreover the format this new form of ‘aid’ is 
particularly beneficial as far as its recipients are concerned. Besides incurring no external 
debt, the greater part of this flow of monetary resources – and most especially that which 
passes informal channels – is delivered directly into the pockets of the inhabitants of some of 
the least developed rural areas in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Indeed it is precisely those 
regions in which the pace of economic development has hitherto been sluggish which have 
generated disproportionately large outflows of transnational labour migrants.  
 
Labour migration is now a global phenomenon: not only are cities in all parts of the globe 
drawing in additional labour power on an unprecedented scale, but there are now few 
communities anywhere in the world – no matter how remotely located – whose members do 
not tap into migratory networks of one form or another. Moreover a focus on the dynamics of 
those networks themselves soon reveals that the links between poverty and migration are far 
more complex than has hitherto been appreciated. From a historical perspective it is quite 
clear that few long-distance migrants ever saw themselves as being engaged in a one-way 
‘flight from poverty’: on the contrary the trans-local linkages generated by migratory 
movements were invariably much more circular in character (Piore 1979). Hence whilst 
migration may indeed be caused by poverty, it is simultaneously an active – and very often a 
very successful – remedy to that very condition, thanks above all to the reverse transfers in 
the form of remittances to which such population outflows invariably give rise. Moreover as 
high-speed and low cost air travel has replaced slow that in slow-moving steamships, and a 
telecommunications revolution has bridged hitherto yawning transnational spaces, making the 
most of these circulatory opportunities has never been easier. From this perspective it is not 
only immediately apparent that migration and economic advancement have always been two 
sides of the same coin, but that remittances and the prospect of raising levels of economic 
prosperity for their kinsfolk ‘back home’ have always been a significant part of most long-
distance labour migrants’ agendas. Indeed it is precisely because of the strength of the 
kinship networks in which they are embedded, together with the speed and sophistication of 
the current global communications networks that contemporary long-distance labour 
migrants, and especially those drawn from rural areas in the non-European world, have a 
particularly ardent commitment not just to personal wealth-creation, but to economic 
development in its fullest sense.  
1.1 The Migrants’ perspective 
Few such migrants view the world in individualistic terms: instead they invariably see 
themselves as members of, and hence contributors to, a corporate family unit. Hence it is not 
so much on their own account but on behalf of their families that most set off on their travels, 
and the object of the exercise is consequently not so much personal advancement, but rather 
to improve the material prospects of their entire kindred, so enabling the group as a whole to 
invest in a better future. Hence labour migrants most usual stance once they reach their 
destination is deferral of gratification, so enabling them to remit a substantial part of their 
hard-won earnings back home.  
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Given their relatively poverty-stricken origins, there is a widespread assumption that such 
behaviour is primarily driven by an urge to meet their families’ basic subsistence needs. 
Nothing could be more mistaken. The overwhelming majority of labour migrants set their 
sights a great deal higher, most especially when they have succeeded – often at great expense 
– in penetrating a section of the metropolitan labour market where wages are an untold 
multiple of those available at home. In these circumstances remittance flows are typically 
used to finance the construction of a fine new house for the entire extended family, to educate 
their own and their siblings’ children in the expectation of radically improving their 
employment prospects, to purchase more land and better agricultural machinery, or to finance 
a local business enterprise of some sort. In other words remittance driven expenditure is 
invariably much more strongly investment- than subsistence-oriented. 
 
If labour migrants are consequently much better viewed as active entrepreneurs than as 
helpless victims, and if it is further acknowledged that the scope for such entrepreneurial 
initiatives is particularly large in the case of those migrants who manage to break their way 
into metropolitan labour markets, the collective consequences of their efforts are now plain to 
see. They are generating a huge transfer of capital resources – whose total scale is clearly 
substantially larger than the already-enormous figures cited by Rathore – the greater part of 
which passes straight into the pockets of some of the most severely disadvantaged sections of 
the world’s population. The potential for economic transformation to which transfers give 
rise can only be described as being as positive as it is immense.  
1.2 Changing money 
Nevertheless making the most of that potential is proving to be far from easy: if the arrival of 
migrant remittances simply precipitates a boom in the service sector which undermines the 
local economy’s already all too limited productive base, the resultant islands of apparent 
affluence may in fact find themselves locked ever more comprehensively into positions of 
dependency. But as I have sought to show at some length elsewhere (Ballard 2003, 2004) this 
all too commonplace outcome is not so much the result of insufficient entrepreneurial effort 
on the part of migrants and their families, rather because of a yet deeper paradox. As migrants 
regularly discover, the obstacles in the way successful entrepreneurial initiatives they 
encounter back in their home base tend to be far more serious those they faced during the 
course of their adventures on nominally far more hostile territory overseas. Hence this 
Chapter focuses on one of the most pressing challenges with which transnational labour 
migrants currently find themselves confronted: how to transfer their savings back home 
without losing a disproportionate slice of their value in transmission costs.  
 
As every traveller knows, switching small sums of cash from one currency to another is an 
expensive business: every transaction leads to a significant portion of the underlying value 
being sliced off in commission charges. Labour migrants face yet more serious difficulties, 
since they often have no alternative but send their remittances home unaccompanied. In these 
circumstances a commission of 10% even for payments into a bank account is unexceptional, 
and the figure can rise to double that if the destination is sufficiently remote.  As a result all 
migrant workers share a common priority: to find some means of getting their savings back 
home swiftly and reliably, but in such a way as to avoid the exorbitant commissions charged 
by established formal money-transmission agencies. The result is wholly predictable. 
Wherever migrant workers of similar origins gather together on a sufficient scale to be able to 
create an ethnic colony, one of their first collective actions is invariably to construct an 
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alternative – and necessarily informal – value transmission system by means of which to 
remit their savings back home.  
2 The role of hawala in the transfer of remittances from UK to South Asia 
2.1 The emergence of the hawala system 
South Asian settlers in Britain are no exception to this pattern, and given that they and their 
descendants are now more than two million strong, they have by now constructed some 
highly sophisticated means of achieving these ends. Nevertheless current forms of IVTS – of 
which the highly sophisticated Hawala system is currently the most widely used – took some 
considerable time to construct. When pioneer settlers began to establish themselves in the UK 
over half a century ago, they had little alternative but to use International Postal Orders to 
send money home. But once mass migration took off during the 1960s, the authorities in both 
India and Pakistan directed their then still-nationalised banks to take advantage of this new 
commercial opportunity by opening branches in those areas from which labour migrants had 
been recruited in particularly large numbers. In the event, however, the success of this 
initiative was extremely mixed. Whilst the banks certainly drew large sums into savings 
accounts, especially since interest rates comfortably exceeded those available in the Post 
Office, much less success was achieved in the remittance market. From their customers’ 
perspective it was easy to see why. Besides their high levels of commission and slow speed 
of delivery, the process of extracting the cash once it had arrived could be as difficult as it 
was humiliating if the recipient was illiterate; by contrast informal systems were a great deal 
more user-friendly.  
 
As far as its customers were concerned the hawala system worked extremely smoothly. Cash 
was deposited with a hawaladar – initially a local shopkeeper, but as the system grew 
steadily larger and more sophisticated, most usually a specialist travel agent – and the rest 
was easy. Within a matter of days (and often hours as communications systems became 
steadily more sophisticated) the cash was delivered in person to the consignee, no matter how 
remote his or her village might be. Delivery was swift, often made in person, and safety 
absolute. Better still the sterling/rupee conversion rate offered by hawaladars was invariably 
higher – often by substantial margin – than that available through the formal banking system. 
Unless formal receipts were required, as for example when migrants needed to demonstrate 
that they had been providing financial support for their wives and children in order to obtain 
entry visas to enable them to reunite their families in the UK, hawala rapidly became the 
preferred medium of value transmission.  
 
Nevertheless as the number of UK-based settlers and hence the volume of transactions grew 
apace, competition between the formal and informal systems grew steadily more intense. 
Even so hawaladars invariably had the edge, especially when either the Indian or the 
Pakistani rupee was in trouble, since they could then offer conversion at the unofficial rather 
than the official rate of exchange, rendering their swift and low-cost service yet more 
attractive still. By the turn of the millennium this form of IVTS was big business. Not only 
did virtually every Pakistani travel agency in the UK offer hawala alongside ticketing 
services, but such was the scale of the differential between the official and unofficial rate of 
exchange that the virtually all remittances were routinely channelled through the hawala 
system. But whilst fieldwork revealed the far-reaching economic impact which the arrival of 
migrant remittances had had in the rural areas from which mass migration to the UK had 
taken place, and whilst the managers of formally constituted banks serving these areas readily 
confirmed that hawala had become so popular that their forex business had dropped to 
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virtually zero (Ballard 2003), it was much less clear as to exactly how the system of value 
transmission which ensured that pounds sterling from Bradford were transformed into 
Pakistani rupees ready for delivery in Mirpur actually worked. Although my ethnographic 
observations had enabled me to gain a shrewd estimation of the procedures which were likely 
to be involved, I found it quite impossible to gain any kind of concrete confirmation of how 
this was actually achieved. Despite my anthropological wiles, I had long since discovered 
that hawaladars were no more willing to lay out the details of their commercial operations 
than would the manager of my bank in the UK would be prepared to open all his accounts for 
public inspection. 
2.2 Enter Customs and Excise 
Then, quite unexpectedly, I had the benefit of a fortunate break. In January 2001 HM 
Customs and Excise announced that they had arrested a number of  Hawaladars operating in 
Bradford, Birmingham and Halifax, and that they had been charged with laundering excess of 
£ 600 million through their businesses during the course of the preceding two years. Soon 
after the arrests had been made I was approached by solicitors acting for one of the arrested 
hawaladars, from whom I discovered that the prosecution case was as straightforward as it 
was vague, namely that ‘sensibly … such large amounts of cash must have been the proceeds 
of crime, and a large proportion of it must have been from drug smuggling’. Given that I was 
broadly familiar with the how the hawala system operated, and also that I indicated that the 
inference that Customs had drawn was by no means necessarily so ‘sensible’ as the 
prosecution appeared to believe, I was instructed to act as an expert witness for the defence. 
Moreover having been so instructed I was promptly given access to all the evidence on which 
the prosecution intended to rely once the case came to trial, the greater part of which 
consisted of voluminous records of all the hawaladars’ transactions, right down to the level of 
individual recipients and their villages of origin.  
 
Some months later, by when I had been briefed to prepare reports in four parallel cases, I 
realised that I was in a position to kill at least two birds with one stone. Over and above my 
legal duties, which was to offer expert opinion as to how far the available evidence supported 
the prosecution’s contention that each of these hawala operations was merely a carefully 
constructed front behind which four massive money-laundering operations had conveniently 
been concealed, I realised I had also been presented with a wholly unprecedented academic 
opportunity: the production of a detailed and empirically grounded analysis of the day to day 
operation of the Anglo-South Asian dimension of the contemporary global hawala system.  
2.3 The specific dimensions of my window of opportunity 
Academic research in the social sciences is very often strongly opportunistic in character: 
lacking the resources to command the production of data, let alone to require respondents to 
provide answers to intrusive questions, researchers have little alternative but to make the 
most of every available opportunity. All such opportunities bring with them their own 
intrinsic limitations. Hence whilst the opportunity to explore the everyday operation of 
remittance-driven hawala was – so far as I am aware – quite unprecedented, the perspective 
to which was thereby opened up was by definition highly specific in character. Firstly there is 
the issue of criminality: to what extent is it reasonable to assume that the records which I 
examined were accurate, given the prospect that the whole edifice was no more than a pack 
of lies which has been carefully constructed to obfuscate criminal activities? Whilst my own 
judgement suggests that this was not the case – for reasons which I will set out more 
explicitly as and when appropriate – it is ultimately for my readers to make their own 
decisions about the coherence and plausibility of the analysis presented here.  
 5
Secondly, and more seriously, it is also worth stressing the data to which I thereby gained 
access also had serious analytical limitations – no matter regardless of its trustworthiness. 
Hence even though the opportunity to inspect detailed records of a huge mass of hawala 
transactions originating in Bradford and Birmingham and giving rise to deliveries to specific 
recipients in villages and towns across the length and breadth of Indian and Pakistani Punjab 
provided me with an unprecedented opportunity to explore the detailed character of a large 
number of individual transactions, as well as the localised processes of consolidation and 
deconsolidation which took place at both ends of the chain, it soon became clear that this 
bottom-up perspective could only produce the broadest of pointers as to the way in which the 
system as a whole operates when viewed from a more global perspective. Nevertheless access 
to those pointers was crucial. Not only did they confirm my initial suspicion that 
contemporary hawala is an extremely complex operation whose logic can only be grasped 
when understood as a systematic whole, but they also provided a clear indication of the 
precise directions in which I should look for additional material with which to illuminate that 
logic.  
 
Hence whilst the UK data to which I was so fortunate to gain access provide the core of this 
paper’s empirical foundations, my analysis is by no means limited to the retail transactions 
which the bulk of this data so minutely describes. Rather I have taken the opportunity to build 
upwards and outwards from those foundations, drawing material from elsewhere as and when 
available, in an effort to make sense of the structural character of the contemporary global 
hawala system. This has also enabled me both to critique and to develop the relatively 
simplistic representations of how IVTS works which appear in the existing literature.   
2.4 The systematic dynamics of hawala: consolidation, de-consolidation and settlement 
As the vast bulk of the currently available literature quite correctly indicates, Hawala is in 
essence a system of swaps. But whilst very largely organised on a word-of-mouth basis with 
a minimum of back-office support, the swaps themselves are of a kind entirely familiar to the 
staff of the Forex department in any international bank. When different branches of a given 
bank operate in different currency zones, it follows that if branch A trading in local currency 
a can contrive to match local depositors’ remittances in currency a with a similarly sized set 
of payments out to local recipients, also in currency a, with a parallel set of payments, both 
out and in, denominated in currency b in some distant branch of the bank operating B, the 
necessarily costly process of cross-currency settlements can be entirely avoided, thereby 
maximising group profits. However forex operations in the real world are invariably far more 
complex. To be sure the global sum of all foreign exchange transactions must by definition be 
zero. But given that the number of deals struck on a daily basis in the world at large is huge, 
and that such deals are struck in a multiplicity of currencies in a multiplicity of jurisdictions 
and as between a multiplicity of traders, the prospect the books of any one institution will 
balance out at the end of the day is remote in the extreme, no matter how vast its global reach 
may be. Hence forex accounts can only be balanced through a complex – and necessarily 
expensive – processes of consolidation and settlement in major money markets such as 
London and New York. Indeed it is precisely because of the complexity of such processes 
that small forex transactions – or in other words those of less than $100,000 or so – attract 
such significant percentage transaction costs.   
 
The universe within which contemporary remittance-driven hawala operates is constituted in 
just the same way as that constructed by the formal banking sector. Moreover since the vast 
majority of remittance transactions are small – usually somewhere in the $500 - $5,000 range 
– it must of necessity find some way of supporting processes of consolidation and settlement 
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whose structural character is identical with, but frequently even more complex than, those 
implemented within and amongst formally constituted international banks. To be sure the two 
kinds of operation could not look more different from the customers’ perspective. 
Hawaladars do not operate from within expensive marble-clad banking halls: theirs are at 
best store-front operations, whose facilities can be accessed through a multiplicity of agents 
and sub-agents, most of whom provide hawala facilities as a side-business in local grocery 
stores or a travel agency. The bureaucratic content of each transaction is minimal, not least 
because the Hawaladar and his customers are normally members of the same small ethnic 
colony, and hence already know and trust each other. Once the sterling cost of the required 
sum in rupees has been agreed upon the transaction can be completed very swiftly. The 
customer hands over his payment – invariably in cash – to the hawaladar, to whom he also 
supplies the name, the address, and relevant personal details of the recipient to whom the 
rupees are to be delivered. The funds so purchased are normally available at the nominated 
destination within 48 hours, and may either be delivered directly to the recipient, or failing 
that be available for collection at the office of a nearby distributing hawaladar. The 
remoteness of the recipient’s place of residence is immaterial: the system is deliberately 
organised in such a way as to facilitate the delivery of remittances to the specific villages and 
hamlets from which members of any given local settlement are drawn.  
 
From its users’ point of view hawala has everything to recommend it. The process is simple 
and straightforward, and senders hand over their hard-earned cash to a well-known local 
figure in whom they not only have confidence, but who would be honour bound to respond to 
their complaints if anything went wrong. Not that they have any expectation that problems 
will occur: funds sent informally are delivered much more swiftly and reliably than those sent 
through formal channels. Better still the exchange rate offered by Hawaladars is often 
substantially greater (sometimes by as much as 20%) than the ‘official’ rate, and commission 
rate – if charged at all – is rarely greater than 1%. In these circumstances there is simply no 
contest between the hawaladars and the services offered by organisations such as 
MoneyGram or Western Union, whose commission for transferring funds to remote 
destinations can attract commissions of as much as 15%.   
 
Yet on just what basis do hawaladars manage to achieve such a striking level of competitive 
advantage? The answer – as I soon discovered once I gained access to their records – was 
threefold. In the first place the hawala system uses exactly the same procedures of wholesale 
consolidation and settlement as those deployed in the formal banking sector. Secondly, and 
just as significantly, the system dramatically reduces the heavy overheads normally 
associated with the implementation of consolidation and settlement procedures by restricting 
their formal record keeping solely to that required to ensure the accurate completion of each 
and every deal between individual hawaladars – but not of the further deals in which other 
hawaladars further up and down the chain will also by definition be involved. Thirdly and 
most crucially, the principal guarantor of system security is grounded not so much in 
elaborate and expensive bureaucratic procedures, but rather in the relationships of absolute 
personal trust which all players in the hawala market maintain between themselves. Taken 
together, these principles have far reaching commercial consequences. Since every individual 
hawaladar in this distributed system can safely cut his back-office procedures to the bone, 
multiple transactions can be accurately processed at levels of operational efficiency which the 
formal sector cannot begin to hope to match.  
 
Despite the substantial differences between hawaladars’ operating conventions and those 
deployed within the formal banking sector, it certainly does not follow that they routinely 
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operate outwith the formal sector. Quite the contrary: once hawaladars had used these 
informal procedures to consolidate a multitude of small transactions into tranches of a 
suitable size for settlement swaps, they had no hesitation about implementing deals at this 
level – most usually with other physically distant hawaladars – through the super-secure 
SWIFT global inter-bank value-transmission system. In other words whilst hawala operators 
readily consolidate and de-consolidate in terms of physical currency notes whenever it is to 
their commercial advantage to do so, they have no hesitation about switching to wire transfer 
(or in other words the resources of the formal system) whenever that ceases to be the case – 
as for example with large-scale long-distance value transfers. There is nothing mysterious 
about these strategic choices: they simply reflect hawaladars’ careful exploitation of every 
available opportunity to cut costs. 
 
Whilst this certainly means that hawaladars abjure all unnecessary record-keeping, it 
certainly does not follow that they keep no records. Given that the core function of 
remittance-driven hawala systems is to implement the swift and reliable completion of a large 
number of individual transfers to distant and highly specific destinations, and that the 
ultimate execution of these value transfers necessarily gives rise to the accurate 
implementation of large and complex processes consolidation and settlement on a daily basis, 
detailed record-keeping is essential. In its absence clients’ funds would rapidly go astray and 
the system would collapse. Indeed the more closely I examined the hawaladars’ paperwork, 
the more impressed I became by the simultaneous frugality and efficiency of their approach 
to record keeping: all material which was not immediately germane to the matter in hand was 
normally rigorously discarded. To be sure frugality might cause great frustration to an 
accountant trained to conduct audit trails through systems which deploy a far more luxuriant 
approach to data recording. However once I began to get to grip with the logic of hawaladars’ 
procedures, and hence to understand how I could trace through the details of their operations, 
I became increasingly impressed by the scale, the sophistication, the global reach and above 
sheer efficiency of the system which they had created.  
 
This last point also turned out to be crucial: indeed taking a systematic view of what was 
going on proved to be the key to understanding of what hawala is all about. At one level each 
hawaladar operates a free-standing business: hence profits arise, just as in any other business, 
as a result of each hawaladar maintaining a positive balance as between his incomings and 
outgoings. However hawaladars are in no way responsible for each others’ profitability. Quite 
the contrary. Hawaladars are in constant competition with one another, and if any given 
hawaladar fails to fulfil any deal he has struck with his fellow operators, he will promptly be 
dropped from the game. But despite this condition of vigorous competition between 
individual hawaladars, and the ruthlessness with which sanctions for non-compliance are 
applied, the financial arena which hawaladars construct around themselves is the very 
antithesis of a Hobbesian war of all against all. Quite the contrary. In a manner which will 
doubtless be deeply puzzling to most Western observers, the secret of Hawala’s success lies 
in its operators’ successful construction of a globally extended but comprehensively 
distributed system of self-regulating reciprocities, and whose system-security is grounded in 
the networks of absolute trust which hawaladars at all levels so carefully maintain as the very 
foundation of their business.  
 
From that perspective any given hawaladar’s operation is anything but autonomous: rather it 
is little more than a specific local node of a huge self-regulating transnational network, 
membership of which permits that operator to cut deals with other distant hawaladars, and 
thus to turn a profit. In the context of such a distributed system that any given operator’s 
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horizon of knowledge will tend to be extremely limited, for the only prerequisite for doing 
business is that he can have absolute trust in all the partners with whom he makes deals. 
Details of the deals his partners make, let alone those of his partners’ partners, are no concern 
of his. As I gradually began to realise it is only by tapping into the system from an alternative 
perspective, most especially by opening a window which provides a perspective from the top 
down to complement the local hawaladar’s view from the bottom up, that one can begin to 
appreciate the logic of the system as a whole. But to reach that goal we must start at the other 
end of the scale by making a step by step examination of each of the hawala system’s 
component parts. 
3 Hawala in practice 
3.1 Retail (remittance) hawaladars in the UK 
In what has now become a remittance-driven system, the activities of the retail hawaladars 
provide a natural starting point for any such analysis. It is they who provide over-the-counter 
remittance facilities to members of local ethnic colonies, and in that context hawala 
transactions appear to be extremely straightforward. Having negotiated a price in pounds 
sterling for the sum in rupees which his customer requires, the hawaladar notes the name of 
the sender, the name and address of the recipient, and of the sum to be delivered. Then sends 
a daily fax listing all these details through to his distributing partner in the subcontinent, and 
the promised cash deliveries will be duly made.  
 
But having set out the basic principles, actual practice is a great deal more complex. It is easy 
to see why. Such a small-scale retailer might well deal with ten customers in the course of a 
day; but for such a small-scale operator to seek to implement the complex transactions 
required to complete these would make no sense whatsoever: hence retail hawaladars 
routinely act as agents, if not sub-agents, for much larger wholesale hawaladars operating at a 
higher level in the network. Hence every local retail hawaladar is in regular contact with a 
much larger wholesale operator; and it is to such regional wholesalers, rather than to partners 
in South Asia, that each retailer faxes off his daily list of delivery instructions.  
3.2 The role of the wholesale (consolidating) hawaladar 
As I soon realised when I examined their records, all the hawaladars whose books I had an 
opportunity to examine were major wholesale operators. With offices located in the heart of 
very substantial South Asian ethnic colonies in cities such as Birmingham and Bradford, most 
also offered retail services to walk-in customers, but nevertheless the bulk of their business 
was passed up to them from extensive networks of agents and sub-agents located in South 
Asian ethnic colonies spread out across the length and breadth of the UK. In this respect such 
major wholesalers are best understood as consolidators: besides sending daily notifications of 
the going exchange rate to their agents and sub-agents, they draw in retail customers’ 
instructions about rupee deliveries, as well as their cash deposits, for central processing. This 
made sense. Thanks to the complex network of agencies and sub-agencies which each such 
hawaladar maintained, wholesalers were in a position to combine a huge mass of delivery 
instructions from individual retail customers into a much smaller number of consolidated 
tranches, each of which could be faxed off en bloc delivery hawaladars located in specific 
locations in India and Pakistan from which there had been a heavy migrant outflow; and as I 
had already guessed – and as the records confirmed – when delivery hawaladars received a 
faxed tranche of instructions they promptly deconsolidated them into a multiplicity of 
component parts which were in turn handled by their own networks of delivery agents and 
sub-agents. Indeed as I subsequently observed, the presence of agents and sub-agents is a 
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salient feature of every dimension of the hawala system – no matter whether its primary 
concern is with collection or with distribution, or whether its scope is narrowly parochial or 
comprehensively global.  
 
Consolidation is the key to the operating efficiency of the hawala system. With such 
structures in place, wholesalers in Bradford or Birmingham are in a position to consolidate a 
whole tranche of instructions about rupee deliveries sent into them by their agents and sub-
agents located all over the UK on a daily basis, ready for onward transmission by fax or email 
to their distributing counterparts in Mirpur, Gujjar Khan, Jhelum, Kharrian and so forth, each 
of whom will promptly de-consolidate these incoming instructions for onward distribution to 
their own local network of village-level agents and sub-agents. Cash is treated in just the 
same way: rather paying funds received from walk-in customers straight into a bank account, 
the vast majority of retail hawaladars bundle up their cash receipts before sending them on – 
usually on a weekly basis – to the wholesaler, who is consequently in a position to deposit the 
funds in very much larger consolidated tranches.  
 
Yet although the resultant processes of bundling, unbundling and rebundling a constant flow 
both of cash and of rupee delivery instructions were intrinsically time-consuming, and hence 
were a major component of every wholesaler’s daily activities, they only make up half the 
underlying hawala operation. Whilst it is easy enough for a hawaladar at any level in the 
system to fax instructions to delivery partner in South Asia, those partners can only 
implement the instructions which they receive if the sender can also arrange to provide his 
partners with the wherewithal in cash to enable them to do so. As I very soon discovered, 
whilst the sending of delivery instructions to overseas hawaladars and providing them with 
the cash with which to make those deliveries are necessarily complementary activities, in this 
case the processes whereby this necessary marriage was achieved were invariably 
implemented along two quite separate channels. Whilst settlement is indeed a key component 
of the whole process of hawala, it is nevertheless worth noting that the models of how this is 
achieved which are set out in the current literature (as for example in El Qorchi et al, 2003: 6 
- 9) are hugely over-simplified. Although useful as a basic introduction, if left undeveloped 
they do more to obscure than to illuminate the extremely complex series of transactions 
which underpin the contemporary system of globally-oriented hawala. 
 
The source of these complexities is not hard to detect. Given that the contemporary hawala 
systems is so strongly remittance driven, the simple bilateral swaps between HA and HB of 
the kind which El Qorchi envisages in his model scarcely ever occur. In the relatively remote 
rural areas from which the great majority of contemporary unskilled labour migrants (and 
hence likely hawala customers) are drawn, local money markets – to the extent that they exist 
– are already flooded with hard currency, since many visitors from overseas bring emergency 
top-up funds with them in cash; hence there is no way in which delivery hawaladars can find 
a sufficient number of local customers wishing to sell rupees in exchange for hard currency 
deliveries which they could readily be made from the deposits piling up in their sending 
counterparts’ bank accounts in Bradford and Birmingham. To be sure there are all sorts of 
money markets in which there are large numbers of purchasers who are only too eager to 
exchange their soft rupees for harder currency, but these markets are located in far-away 
cities such as Karachi, Bombay, Kabul and Dubai, and in any event the unit of exchange in 
such markets is not sterling but US dollars.  
 
The reasons for the bifurcation between the transmission of delivery instructions on the one 
hand, and the delivery of the cash with which to make those deliveries on the other should 
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now be clear: the settlement processes which permit the implementation of the central 
dynamic of the whole operation – namely the delivery of huge volumes of cash to the 
inhabitants of remote rural areas – are of necessity immensely more complex than the current 
literature suggests. Hence just as we followed through the processing of delivery instructions 
step by step, so we must do the same with the cash. 
3.3 Hawaladars’ use of the formal banking sector 
The complexity of these processes immediately came into focus once I began to explore just 
how UK based wholesale hawaladars dealt with their cash receipts. Although this included a 
mass of small sums which they received from their own over-the counter customers, by far 
the greatest part of the flow of cash which they processed was either passed up to them by 
their agents and sub-agents, or was passed on to them in even more substantial tranches by 
semi-independent wholesalers who tapped into their capacity to provide an overseas 
transmission service in US dollars. At this wholesale level sums involved were invariably 
large: even in slack periods cash deliveries totalled several hundred thousand pounds a week, 
and frequently rose to well over a million in busy periods – all of which was paid straight into 
holding account in a local high street bank. But here, too, hawaladars also made careful use 
of economies of scale. As I soon discovered, banks impose charges for cash deposits on a 
commercial scale, that rises steeply if currency notes are delivered unsorted; but by sorting, 
counting, packing and delivering currency notes to the bank’s precise specifications, 
hawaladars found they could negotiate a substantially lower commission. Having made the 
necessary arrangements for physical delivery either with Securicor and Brinks, they all 
promptly took advantage of that facility.  
 
Not that they left those funds, once delivered, lying idle for very long. As a further crucial 
component of their business they also negotiated a further arrangement with their banks: the 
capacity to give instructions to make spot purchases of US dollars on the London money 
market through their bank’s own dealing room. As a result hawaladar was in a position to use 
the funds deposited in his sterling denominated holding account to make wholesale purchases 
of US dollars on the basis of a single fax-confirmed telephone call. However what was also 
very striking that hawaladars transformed their sterling deposits into much more 
internationally negotiable US dollars on a daily basis, they rarely, if ever, transferred the 
funds they had acquired directly to Karachi or Bombay. Instead the greater part of their dollar 
purchases were sent straight to accounts in New York, and of these close to three-quarters of 
those transfers were placed in accounts maintained by a small number of Dubai-based 
Exchange Houses at the New York headquarters of either the Bank of America or failing that 
the Midland Marine. These transfers to Exchange House accounts also displayed a further 
distinctive characteristic: the hawaladars’ bank statements showed that the great majority 
were either for precisely $100,000, whilst the remainder checked in at precisely two or three 
– and very occasionally at four or five – times that figure. But whilst these very large 
wholesale transfers accounted for well over half of the volume of the transfers by value, they 
were also accompanied by a much larger number of smaller and more irregularly sized 
transfers – usually ranging between $10,000 and $50,000 to a huge array of accounts held 
both by named individuals and by commercial enterprises in formally constituted on-shore 
Banks scattered through Europe, North America, the Gulf and East Asia – although rarely, if 
ever, in South Asia itself.  
 
One point was by now quite plain: this arm of the remittance driven arm of the Hawala 
system routinely used the formal banking system for the onward transmission of migrants’ 
now consolidated remittances. Moreover there could be no doubt about the purpose of this 
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process of onward value transmission: it must, by definition be part of a settlement process. 
Even so it left a substantial mystery hanging in the air, since there could be no understanding 
as to how the circle of settlement was finally closed without a much more specific 
understanding of how an outflow of US dollars from Bradford gave rise to a parallel inflow 
of rupees to a series of rural distribution centres in northern Pakistan.  
 
On the face of it very little evidence with which to answer this question was immediately 
available. Although the scale of these operations was large – the hawaladars’ records to 
which I had access recorded transfers totalling around $ 600 million in the course of two 
years – the available documentation did not indicate the basis on which any of these 
payments had been made, and in the case of payments into the Exchange Houses’ accounts 
gave no indications as to who the ultimate beneficiaries of these transfers might be. To be 
sure these value transfers took place swiftly and expeditiously; but the hawaladars who set 
them up could offer very little in the way of detailed explanation as to what these transfers 
were all about. Such matters were beyond their knowledge-horizon. All that they could do 
was to confirm that all these payments had come about as a result of hawala deals which they 
had made with brokers operating on behalf of one or other of the Dubai-based Exchange 
houses, and through which they negotiated the purchase of rupees to be delivered to their 
instructions in Northern Pakistan against a payment in US dollars transmitted by TT to the 
broker’s instructions.  
 
But before we go on to explore the mysteries of global hawala – which will only become 
possible once we have moved to a position from which we can take more of a top-down – as 
opposed to a bottom-up – perspective on the hawala system, and from where we be can bring 
these mysteries more clearly into focus, two further local complexities must also be noted. 
Firstly UK-based wholesale hawaladars can conveniently be divided into two broad 
categories. Of those functioning at this level a relatively small number of operators can best 
be described as having gained the status of full-function wholesalers: as such they hade direct 
access to foreign exchange facilities through their local bank, together with the capacity to 
use the bank’s TT facilities to transfer dollars purchased in the spot market to overseas 
destinations of their choice by means of a single, simple, faxed instruction.1 Meanwhile a 
substantially larger number of operators whom we can perhaps best describe aspirant (as 
opposed to full-function) wholesalers conducted all aspects of the consolidation and delivery 
process – with the sole exception the final stage of converting their customers’ sterling 
deposits into US dollars – on an ‘in house’ basis, before turning to their full-function 
counterparts for assistance in completing the final overseas component of the transaction. 
Hence aspirant operators regularly made bulk deliveries in cash to the full-function 
wholesalers, who in turn took responsibility – in return for a small fee – for its conversion 
into US dollars for onward transmission by TT to overseas recipients.  
 
All this was further overlaid by a second source of complexity, since it soon became clear 
that by no means all the deals which UK-hawaladars completed were initiated as a result of 
them contacting Dubai-based brokers to negotiate a deal for the purchase of rupees for local 
delivery in South Asia against US dollar transfers TT financed by their own in-house 
resources. As my hawaladar contacts readily indicated, in addition to the hawala business 
which they themselves initiated, they were also frequently approached by the Dubai-based 
                                                 
1  All the South Asian hawaladars whose records I  have been able to inspect as a result of their arrest on money 
laundering charges fell into this category; at the time at which their arrests took place, I would estimate that 
there were perhaps a further fifteen full-function wholesale hawaladars serving the Indo-Pakistani remittance 
market in the UK.  
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brokers from whom they purchased rupees, but who were in this case interested in making 
use of the wholesale hawaladars’ foreign exchange facilities as a means of converting sterling 
into dollars. Hence they were in regular receipt of phone calls from Dubai seeking quotations 
for the conversion of a large tranches of sterling (which would be delivered in cash) into US 
dollars, to be forwarded overseas by TT to the brokers’ instructions. These Dubai-based 
brokers were clearly fishing in a highly competitive market, since the deal would be closed 
with whichever hawaladar responded to the broker’s offer with the most competitive bid. 
Once such a deal had been closed a cash delivery would arrive, which the selected hawaladar 
would then count, bank, convert into dollars and transmit overseas as directed. 
3.4 The role of global (settlement) hawaladars 
Having examined all the arrested hawaladars’ records and bank accounts, and having quizzed 
them at some lengths about the precise ways in which they had gone about their business, it 
was by now quite clear that although they were involved in some exceedingly complex 
processes of consolidation and settlement through which very large sums of money were 
speedily and efficiently processed, from the perspective of those engaged in implementing 
these processes in the UK the logic of the global hawala system – and most particularly of the 
settlement deals which quite clearly lay at its heart – was quite literally ‘over the horizon’. 
But although they consequently did not know exactly how the system, qua system, actually 
worked, they could readily indicate just where those unknown processes were actually 
worked out: in a small number of Dubai-based Exchange houses2 with whose agents the UK-
based hawaladars regularly struck their hawala deals. However in striking those deals the 
central concern of UK-based hawaladars was simply to get the best available conversion rate: 
and like all other transactions within the system, those deals were closely haggled. But 
precisely because hawala is a distributed rather than a centralised system, it followed that all 
and any questions about just how these brokers – and the Exchange houses which clearly 
stood behind them – actually went about obtaining the funds they delivered, or to whom they 
passed them on, was no concern of theirs. In a system based on absolute trust the details of 
such transactions – which in any event were implemented in far distant lands – were of no 
account whatsoever. The key to hawala is that partners (or in other words those who have 
stuck a deal) fulfil their obligations promptly and to the letter: all other considerations – with 
the exception of those which have a bearing on one’s partner’s reputation for trustworthiness 
– are regarded as entirely immaterial. 
 
Having got this far it was quite clear that I still had a great deal more to learn. As I rapidly 
began to appreciate, the deals facilitated within and between the Exchange Houses of Dubai 
facilitate – and which could only be viewed from afar from the perspective of wholesale 
hawaladars operating in Bradford and Birmingham – lie at the very core of the contemporary 
hawala system. Given the huge levels of liquidity generated by their role in the transmission 
and delivery of migrant remittances on a global scale, together with the scale, sophistication 
and complexity of the settlement processes which the system is able to implement, I began to 
discern just why it is that hawala enjoys a position of such massive competitive advantage in 
comparison with the formal banking sector. However neither the Exchange Houses nor their 
role in the hawala system find any mention in the current literature. Hence their role and 
activities are worth discussing in some detail. 
                                                 
2  Those with UK-based hawaladars routinely dealt included Federal Exchange, Multinet Exchange, Sajwani 
Express, Wall Street Exchange and Worldlink Exchange. All are formally registered LLCs, and their central 
head offices are all within very easy walking distance of each other in the Deira business district of Dubai.  
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4 The emergence of Dubai as a lynch-pin in the contemporary hawala system  
4.1 Trade and commercial banking in the Indian Ocean region 
Hawala (literally an exchange of debt) has ancient historical roots in the banking networks 
which grew up to provide financial services to the long-distance traders who began to do 
business across the length and breadth of the Indian Ocean region more than four millennia 
ago, and which had reached an extremely high level of sophistication during the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, during which European traders found they had little alternative but 
to rely on their services (McPherson 1993). But although partially eclipsed by the military 
successes of European colonial powers – and by the formally constituted banking institutions 
which swiftly followed in their wake – during the period which immediately followed, the 
ancient trading networks of which hawala always remained an integral part gained a new 
lease of life during the latter part of the twentieth century, and seem likely to become steadily 
more salient as we move into the twenty first. 
 
This resurgence in activity has many causes, of which four appear to be particularly salient. 
First the very rapid – and continuing – growth in migrant remittances, the bulk of which 
currently flow out of Euro-America’s highly developed urban-industrial centres and into 
economically marginalised but heavily populated regions throughout South, East and South-
East Asia. A second major spur to the resurgence of hawala, and indeed to the growth of the 
informal economy in general, has been over-zealous attempts by many post-colonial states to 
manage their national economies on the basis of centrally controlled edicts, including 
amongst other things strict controls on both foreign trade and foreign exchange. As a result 
the open market value of their currencies frequently stands at a substantial discount to its 
‘official’ value. Thirdly the contradictions which have emerged as the rapid growth of 
manufacturing capacity in many parts of the region has encountered the restrictions imposed 
by central planning, leading to a massive recourse to the informal sector as the only way of 
facilitating otherwise illegitimate local and inter-regional commercial transactions; and last 
but not least Dubai’s recent success in riding the oil boom in such a way that it is has 
managed to replace the more ancient commercial hubs of the western Indian Ocean such as 
Basra, Hormuz and Bombay to become the region’s leading offshore  financial and trading 
entrepôt.  
4.2 The emergence of Dubai as a commercial hub 
To appreciate just how and why this occurred it is worth listing some of the more obvious 
reasons for Dubai’s success. In addition to enjoying the benefits of substantial reserves of oil 
and a tiny indigenous population – a common enough phenomenon in the region – the 
Emirate was also centred around a vital strategic asset: a navigable creek close to the mouth 
of the Persian Gulf. In considering how the most might be made of its resources, Dubai’s 
commercially-astute ruling family soon realised that it would be extremely short-sighted to 
rely solely on the necessarily limited supplies of oil which lay buried beneath its soil. Hence 
right from the beginning of the oil-boom, great efforts were made to reinforce the creek’s 
nascent position as a commercial hub. Those efforts soon bore spectacular fruit.  
 
Whilst the escalation in the price of oil during the 1970’s brought unprecedented levels of 
prosperity to much of the Middle East, the absence of a local labour force to build and 
maintain the explosively expanding physical infrastructure which began to be constructed 
throughout the whole region generated an ever-rising inflow of migrant workers – a large 
proportion of whom were recruited from South Asia. However there was one very important 
respect in which Dubai differed from its immediate neighbours: the extent to which its ruling 
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family actively encouraged (and indeed participated in) all manner of commercial activity. 
That policy has proved most successful. Taking advantage of its favourable geographical 
location, Dubai has emerged as the central hub in a regional system of commercial, 
communications, financial and trading networks, so much so that it has become the preferred 
entrepôt for all manner of linkages with the wider global economy. Hawala is no exception to 
this pattern.  
 
That Dubai should have emerged as the lynch-pin of the contemporary global hawala system 
should come as no surprise. Long-distance traders have been moving back and forth along 
well-worn paths between the Red Sea, the Gulf, South Asia and the South East Asian 
archipelagos for well over two millennia, during the course of which a sophisticated banking 
system – at the core of which was the capacity to facilitate financial settlements between 
widely separated markets – gradually emerged. When European traders first broke into this 
arena they had little alternative but to do business with local hawaladars: that was the only 
basis on both local and inter-regional trade could be financed. But as Imperial hegemony 
became ever more firmly established as the nineteenth century progressed, indigenous 
bankers were swept steadily to one side as the much more bureaucratically organised 
European banks favoured by colonial regimes came to dominate every major commercial and 
financial market place. But despite their consequent marginalisation, hawala networks were 
certainly not eliminated: there was still a strong demand for their services from a huge 
network of so-called ‘country traders’ who operated beyond the European financial frontier. 
Such traders’ networks were far from parochial: stretching over long distances, no less by sea 
than by land, they were frequently the principal lifeline of economic activity into and out of 
the rural areas which they served. These anciently rooted networks which had only been 
placed temporarily in abeyance provided a ready-made foundation for further developments 
in the post-colonial world.  
 
As a result of the tripling of the price of oil in the early 1970s, migration to the Gulf region 
took off explosively during the decade that followed. Since a high proportion of the unskilled 
labour migrants drawn into the Gulf during this period were recruited from economically 
peripheral regions in South Asia, their arrival was soon followed by an equally explosive 
growth in the demand for services through which to transmit their savings back home – a 
niche which was promptly filled by a small number of Indian and Pakistani entrepreneurs 
based in Dubai. The broad outlines of the basis of the deals they began to construct are not 
difficult to discern. During the 1970s and 80s both India and Pakistan were facing severe 
economic difficulties, such that both governments introduced strict controls on access to 
foreign exchange, such that a substantial gulf soon opened up between the ‘official’ and the 
open-market value of both the Indian and the Pakistani rupee. At the same time the formal 
banking network in both countries was still very largely confined to the major towns and 
cities: not only were branches hardly to be found in the rural areas from which such a large 
proportion of migrants were drawn, but the rare branches equipped to receive wire transfers 
from overseas were only to be found in the very largest cities. Given the presence of an active 
market in which buyers so desperate to purchase hard currency that were only to willing to 
sell their rupees at a substantial discount, and an ever growing number of migrant workers 
who had been paid in dollars, dinars and dihrams seeking to switch their savings into rupees, 
the opportunities for hawala were self-evident: all that was needed was the construction of a 
settlement and distribution network so that the rupees so purchased from buyers of hard 
currency – the most active of whom were based in Karachi and Bombay – could be delivered 
to the rural areas from which the majority of labour migrants were drawn.  
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4.3 The growth of the Exchange Houses of Dubai 
One of the earliest – and in the long term one of the most successful – entrepreneurs to enter 
this field was a newly arrived migrant from Udupi, a small town Karnatic coastline of 
Western India. Although trained as a Pharmacist, and initially employed by a pharmaceutical 
company which had opened up an office in Dubai, B. R. Shetty was in fact a member of the 
Chettiar caste, whose traditional specialisation was as bankers. No doubt drawing on well-
established contacts within the community to which he belonged, Shetty developed a side-
business in facilitating the transmission of remittances back to Karnataka and Kerala, from 
which migrant workers had arrived in large numbers. Although this was not his only business 
venture, for he also established a large and very successful chain of hospitals, his UAE 
Exchange also went from strength to strength as it built up a network of agents and sub-
agents who fed in remittances from members of the many Malayali communities which had 
now begun to crystallise across the entire region. But although UAE may have been a pioneer 
in this field, many parallel operations soon began to emerge, each of which tended to provide 
a specialist services for a specific migrant community. Not only Exchange houses serving 
migrants from other parts of India, as well as from Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and a whole host of other regions also begin to emerge, 
but each such Exchange house promptly established a network of agents and sub-agents to 
funnel in remittances from migrants settlements across the length and breadth of Saudi and 
the Gulf. 
 
No doubt drawing on its status as one of the oldest and largest operators in this field, the 
UAE Exchange took a very significant step forward when it applied for access to, and was 
accepted as a member of the SWIFT system of global inter-bank electronic money transfers 
in the mid-1990’s. Not only did this facility immediately enhance its capacity to complete 
transactions with banks in Karnataka and Kerala, which remained its business specialty, but it 
also boosted Dubai’s role as a settlement centre for global hawala. This was further facilitated 
when the UAE Exchange set up a securely firewalled intranet between itself and most of the 
other Exchange Houses in Deira. Not only did this facilitate the completion of settlements as 
between the Exchange Houses themselves, but also enabled the other Exchange Houses to 
gain access to UAE’s newly acquired SWIFT facilities. Although Dubai’s Exchange houses 
may have had their origins in the informal sector, by the time the twenty-first century dawned 
it was manifestly inappropriate to identify them as such: by then not only had all of them 
become fully registered LLCs, but had become an integral component of the global banking 
system. 
 
During the course of a brief visit to Dubai in the summer of 2003 I was able to make some 
first-hand observations. The date is significant, for in a post 9/11 context much had changed, 
at least at the level of appearances. Not only had the increasingly sophisticated web sites 
advertising their services which many of the Exchange Houses had begun to develop prior to 
the collapse of the twin towers long since been dismantled, but they all by now gave pride of 
place to Western Union posters in their store-front displays. However this appeared to be 
doing very little damage to their business: whilst a steady flow of off-the-street retail 
customers could be observed coming into each of the Exchange houses’ offices, Western 
Union’s office looked thoroughly forlorn: although my timetable was not such that I could 
engage in long-term surveillance, I did not observe a single customer entering its doors. Since 
then the Exchange houses appear to have had a further resurgence of confidence. In October 
article appeared in the Business section of The Hindu, indicating that thanks to tie-ups with a 
number of South Indian banks, UAE Exchange was processing an average of 80,000 
remittance transfers a month. Yet more significantly still, all traces of the Western Union 
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logo had disappeared from its website: the use of such wallpaper as protective cover was 
clearly no longer deemed to be necessary.  
 
Yet even if there has been a resurgence of confidence amongst Dubai’s Exchange Houses, 
even though several were forced out of business as a result of pressure from the US Treasury 
in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, it is worth noting that the story which I have set out so far 
has still not addressed the most pressing issue of all. Is the huge outflow of funds collectively 
processed by the Exchange Houses of Dubai no more than a set of one-way streets through 
which remittances are simply consolidated and delivered to distant destinations, or are they 
equally heavily engaged in processing similarly-sized settlement counter-flows?  
5 Settlements and counter-flows 
By definition, labour migrants’ remittances flow one way: from the more developed to the 
less developed regions in the global socio-economic order. That is precisely why their 
development potential is so great. But by just the same token the consequences of their arrival 
is also multi-dimensional: besides delivering capital resources straight into the pockets of the 
hitherto capital-poor, remittances inflate the scale of the local economy by boosting its 
liquidity, and in doing so provide the wherewithal to meet the foreign-exchange costs of 
importing manufactured goods. To be sure many of these imports will often take the form of 
consumer goods, but the arrival of remittances will also provide their wherewith to purchase 
manufactured goods such as tractors, pumps, trucks and bulldozers, all  of which can be 
expected to play a part in reinforcing local infrastructural resources, thereby boosting local 
levels of wealth and productivity. To be sure that potential is by no means always realised, 
and even if it is, the principal beneficiaries are by no means always migrant workers and their 
immediate families. What is undeniable, however, is that migrant remittances provide a 
welcome boost to the forex resources of each of the economies into which they are inserted. 
But just how does this insertion take place, and with just what consequences? 
5.1 Hawala and the informal economy: current developments in Somalia and Afghanistan  
No-where is the vitality of hawala more plainly visible, nor its value as an infrastructural 
resource more clearly highlighted than in those regions where incessant civil war has not only 
led to the effective collapse of the state, but also eroded the greater part of the local 
economy’s productive base. Somalia and Afghanistan provide two current examples of 
regions which have fallen into that unfortunate position. Yet whilst formally constituted 
financial institutions have long since disappeared in both cases, in neither has economic 
activity ceased. Instead informal structures – in which hawala networks play a central role – 
have not only successfully shouldered the burden of oiling the wheels of their respective local 
economies, but also of integrating those ‘failed’ economies into global economic order. 
Moreover it is precisely because the hawala system is ultimately grounded in processes of 
settlement that their efforts have met with such success. 
 
The Somali economy is now almost entirely remittance-driven. Its formal infra-structure, 
from agriculture onwards, has effectively disappeared, and it currently has no significant 
exports other than consignments of quat. Yet although all vestiges of central authority have 
long since been consumed by tribal conflict, local trading networks through which supplies of 
rice, fuel and consumer durables are distributed throughout the region are still very firmly in 
place. Moreover the driving force behind this vitality is plain to see: it is migrant remittances 
delivered through hawala networks which are now primarily responsible for keeping the 
entire the Somali economy afloat. Moreover it is hawala’s capacity to implement forex 
settlement which is the key to its success in doing so. Not only do remittance payments 
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delivered to recipients across the length and breadth of Somalia provide the region’s 
inhabitants with the wherewithal to support themselves on a daily basis, but the counter-flows 
of value to which this inflow of liquidity gives rise enables importers in Mogadishu to use 
credits they consequently accumulate with the Exchange Houses in Dubai (who handle the 
forex dimensions of the whole process) to purchase consignments of rice from Thailand, of 
oil from the Gulf, of consumer goods from Malaysia. From that perspective hawala and the 
economy of Somalia can usefully be regarded as having become virtually coterminous.  
 
Nor is Somalia unique. In his path-breaking study of the Money Exchange Dealers of Kabul, 
Maimbo (2004) shows that hawala currently plays a very similar role in oiling the wheels of 
the Afghan economy, so much so virtually all International Aid Agencies operating in 
Afghanistan now routinely utilise hawala system’s conversion and distribution facilities: 
other than by sending couriers to fetch banknotes from Peshawar, the nearest railhead of the 
formal banking system, hawala is the only means whereby funds can be safely and speedily 
delivered, no matter how remote the destination at which they are required across the length 
and breadth of Afghanistan. Moreover in an extraordinary reversal of conventional 
expectations, many agencies require hawaladars to make such deliveries before sending their 
bank directions to release the funds to the hawaladars’ agents in Peshawar (ibid:11).  The 
logic of the Aid Agencies practices is easy enough to comprehend: to those used to the 
elaborate bureaucratic procedures deployed within formal systems, informal procedures 
appear impossibly unreliable. However not only did the hawaladars of Kabul take the deep-
rooted suspicions of their Western customers in their stride, but Maimbo was clearly 
impressed by the system security of the local money market. He found no evidence of 
hawaladars reneging on any deals that they had struck: as the hawaladars themselves insisted, 
if any one of their number was stupid enough to do so with no good cause he would promptly 
be driven straight out of their carefully self-regulating marketplace with no hope of return.  
 
Most significantly of all Maimbo’s report deals quite directly with the issue of settlement, 
and given that his account is so germane to my concerns, his words are worth quoting at 
length. In the first place he makes it quite clear that as in the UK, Kabul’s hawaladars do not 
operate outwith the formal financial system, for  
All international hawala dealers maintain one or two accounts with formal financial 
institutions. The usual locations … are Peshawar, Islamabad, Dubai, London, and New 
York. These accounts are used for effecting funds transfers for customers and for settling 
with other hawaladars. Many of the dealers in Kabul use their Peshawar-based bank 
accounts to receive dollars from NGOs that want afghani payments made in Afghanistan. 
Also, to avoid having to carry cash within Afghanistan to settle accounts, dealers credit and 
debit each other's Peshawar or Dubai accounts via satellite communication. The London 
and New York accounts are also used to make normal bank transfers to cities where the 
hawaladar has no correspondent relationships with another non-bank institution or 
partner. (ibid: 7-8). 
That Maimbo should have found such linkages in place should by now come as no surprise: 
as in Somalia, migrant remittances (most of which originate in the Gulf) have long been a 
significant contributor to the Afghan economy. Nevertheless since the deposition of the 
Taliban regime by a US-led coalition of the willing, funds from that source have been 
massively overshadowed by the local expenditure of the many international agencies who 
now maintain such an active presence in Afghanistan. As he comments 
The recent surge in the volume of foreign currency entering Afghanistan through international 
aid institutions and NGOs presents researchers with a number of unique questions. How are the 
regional counterparts able to finance payments on behalf of the international aid institutions? 
What is the source of the afghani equivalent paid out in the regions? In the last 12 months, for 
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example, international aid institutions have individually transferred amounts in excess of US$10 
million. Where is the afghani equivalent coming from? (ibid 8) 
At one level the answer to that question is quite straightforward, especially if we keep 
Afghanistan’s past history as well as the current Somali example very firmly in mind. In the 
first place, Kabul is the natural hub of trade routes stretching west through Iran to the 
Mediterranean world, north through central Asia to Russia and China, and southeast into the 
Indian subcontinent; and despite recent upheavals, it still retains its historical role as an 
entrepôt, particularly with respect to Pakistan, with which it shares a long and extremely 
porous border.3 Secondly, and just as importantly, even before civil war led to the collapse of 
Afghanistan’s formal institutions, western-style banking had only developed the shallowest 
of local roots. By contrast Kabul’s money market, whose institutional foundations were very 
much more deeply rooted in the local social order, was largely unaffected by state-failure. 
Indeed it is precisely as a result of the disappearance of the formal sector that Kabul’s 
informal bankers have regained their traditional role as the agents through which virtually all 
Afghan financial transactions – whether within the Afghanistan itself or across its borders – 
are settled. Hence Maimbo’s report effectively demonstrates that hawala (or to put it more 
precisely, this local component of a global IVTS network) and the Afghan economy are 
currently effectively coterminous. The same point holds equally true for Somalia, and 
doubtless of a range other failed or failing states. 
5.2 The role of the informal sector in the developing world 
That said, it is worth pressing the analysis one step further forward. As we have seen, formal 
and informal systems are no sense antitheses of one another: rather they are alternative means 
of achieving similar ends, and in practice regularly inter-penetrate each other. Moreover 
whilst formal systems have indeed become ever more salient on the back of the steady rise of 
Euro-American socio-economic hegemony, such that more informal systems have in general 
been pressed out towards the peripheral margins, in no case have those informal structures 
been completely eliminated. From this perspective Somalia and Afghanistan can usefully be 
viewed as standing at the extreme end of a continuum, in the sense that they are locations in 
which formally constituted financial institutions made a brief appearance before collapsing 
once again, such that their still largely informally constituted local economies have continued 
to tap into the global economy (from which there is no escape in the contemporary world) 
through a globally constituted informal network. However these are clearly extreme cases. 
Whilst comprehensive collapse of the formal sector has so far been relatively rare, there are 
many regions of the contemporary world in which a very substantial proportion of economic 
and financial transactions occur outside the formal sector and its bureaucratically organised 
institutions.  
 
There are many reasons for the maintenance of informality in this sense. Many regions of the 
world are so remote – either in spatial or in socio-economic terms, or both – that they still 
stand beyond the frontier of the formal sector: it has quite literally not yet reached them. In 
other areas the formal sector may temporarily have reached them before disappearing once 
again, normally as a result of state-failure. Somalia and Afghanistan are clear examples of 
this extreme condition. However in more general terms there is a direct correlation between 
weak states, or more precisely of states whose capacity to implement any kind of reliable, 
formally articulated regulatory authority is extremely limited, and the emergence of thriving 
                                                 
3  For many years Afghanistan has been a major ‘under the counter’ source of consumer goods in Pakistan, a 
large proportion of which are shipped duty free by road from Karachi to Kabul, and then smuggled back across 
the border (if indeed they ever crossed it) for sale in Peshawar’s ‘Afghan markets’.  
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self-regulating informal networks as an alternative means of supporting local economic 
activity.  Many examples of weak states in this sense – all of which support large informal 
systems of this kind – can be found throughout the developing world. However another 
equally salient feature of the developing world is the presence of regions in which centralised 
control of the national economy is so intense that all kinds of independent business activity 
have been driven willy-nilly into informal ‘black markets’; moreover where such highly 
centralised states provide little in the way of material support for the broad mass of the 
population, as is routinely the case, the unofficial – and indeed illegal – informal sector is 
very often a crucial life-line to survival as far as most of such state’s unfortunate subjects are 
concerned. Nor, it is worth emphasising, is this state of affairs solely restricted to the 
developing world. Close inspection soon reveals that residents of the developing world who 
find themselves exposed to similar forms of structural marginalisation also resort to informal 
strategies for exactly the same reasons. 
 
It follows the formal and the informal sector are in no sense mutually exclusive, since they 
always and everywhere comprehensively inter-penetrate one another. To be sure formally and 
informally constituted systems differ sharply in many of their operational conventions: this is 
only to be expected, since both arose as entrepreneurial adaptations to specific circumstances, 
within which each can be expected to retain a position of competitive advantage vis-à-vis the 
other. However it would clearly be idle to suggest that one of these approaches is inherently 
‘better’ than the other: each has its own specific strengths and weaknesses.  
 
However in contemporary practice this surely self-evident point is routinely overlooked, not 
least because the two systems are very frequently congruent with political as well as 
commercial rivalries, and hence articulate deep-seated socio-economic contradictions. So it is 
that whilst formal systems almost invariably descend hegemonically from above, and hence 
broadly articulate the interest of the rich, whilst their more informal counterparts invariably 
spring up more or less transgressively from below, and in that sense broadly articulate the 
interests of the poor. Examples of dialectical tensions of this kind can be found in every 
corner of the contemporary world, and are equally active at local, regional, national and 
global level. Not only do contemporary hawala networks very successfully span all these 
arenas of activity, but they also have a very important redistributive function, no less locally 
than globally: as with migrant remittances in general, they are a channel along which huge 
quantities of financial resources are currently being shifted from richer to poorer parts of the 
global economy, so providing poorer economies with unprecedented amounts of financial 
liquidity. The time has come to switch focus beyond this narrow issue of remittances, and to 
consider the systematic consequences which migrants’ transgressive initiatives have now 
begun to have economic processes within the entire region from which the vast majority of 
them are drawn. Dubai provides a particularly convenient point from which to open up a top-
down perspective on the operation of hawala in and around the India Ocean.  
6 A systematic perspective: Hawala as a facilitator of global trade  
6.1 Empirical evidence 
A careful examination of all the examples of hawala-facilitated settlements we have 
considered so far reveals that five highly significant common denominators are almost 
invariably present. Firstly the low level of transfer charges, which never rise much higher 
than 1%; secondly Dubai’s regular appearance as a financial hub, most particularly when 
large-scale transactions are being processed; thirdly frequency with which large scale 
transfers are made in tranches of US$ 100,000 (or multiples thereof), suggesting that this sum 
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is the basic unit of account in whatever market place for which these sums are destined; 
fourthly that all the underlying deals are invariably negotiated and confirmed by word of 
mouth, usually by telephone – but in the absence of landlines by mobile, radio or satellite 
phone – by pairs of hawaladars who stand in a relationship of  comprehensive trust with one 
another; and finally that no matter how informally arranged these deals may be, their 
implementation is normally achieved by wire transfer.  
 
Yet although Dubai is manifestly a regional clearing house for negotiating such deals – 
alongside a parallel regional hub which has also developed in Hong-Kong – the 
implementation of these verbally negotiated hawala swaps not only takes place within the 
formal sector, but most usually involves wholesale transfers into or out of individual or 
corporate accounts held at the New York headquarters of one or other of the United States’ 
major international banks. That New York should be the hub through which the great 
majority of hawala swaps are implemented should come as no surprise: given the primacy of 
the US dollar as both a unit of value and the a medium of exchange in the global economy, 
New York’s banks – which form the current hub of world trade – are by definition the best 
place to do such business. This also gives rise to a further paradox: if anyone is in a position 
to monitor the data which would highlight the character and content of global hawala trades, 
it is the monetary authorities in the USA. But if the US Treasury has run a fine tooth-comb 
through the Exchange Houses accounts in New York – an exercise which, given their 
supervisory responsibilities, they are well-placed to undertake – the results of any such 
investigations have certainly not made their way into the public domain.  
6.2 9/11 and its consequences 
This raises another issue which has bedevilled all recent discussions about how the global 
dimensions of the hawala system might operate: the destruction of the twin towers of New 
York’s World Trade Centre on 9/11/2001. And so intense were the waves of anger and alarm 
precipitated by this outrageous assault on the very epicentre of the global capitalist order that 
all else crumbled before them. As a result the prospect of engaging in any kind of rational 
debate, let alone finding the time and space to conduct careful analytical investigations with 
respect to 9/11 related issues – whether that relationship was evidence-based or merely 
hypothetical – became vanishingly small. Hence when action to counter terrorist finance and 
suppress money laundering rose to the very top of the political agenda the matter was deemed 
so urgent that prior empirical investigation was deemed to be a wholly unnecessary and 
indeed an unpatriotic diversion. Hence the cart was placed very firmly before the horse. As 
Maimbo and Passas (2003:3) note ‘in the rush to create a regulatory framework for informal 
remittances, practice preceded a comprehensive theoretical debate and empirical research’.  
 
Moreover that headlong rush of the ill-informed has continued to this day. Even though 
virtually all sober commentators have taken pains to insist that IVTS ‘is neither the only nor 
the most important financial vehicle used by terrorists, nor the most vulnerable to abuse’ 
(ibid: 14), and even though the perpetrators of the twin towers atrocity appear to have 
financed their whole enterprise through accounts they held with formally constituted banks, 
such sensible words of caution have largely been drowned out by the clamour generated by 
supporters of AML/CFT measures, few of whom have ever displayed much interest in 
whether or not there is any empirical evidence in support of their graphically articulated – but 
nevertheless wholly speculative – accounts of the threat which ‘underground banking’ and 
other such nefarious activities offer to the established global order. Nevertheless their 
successes appear to be legion. Born in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the AML industry 
since enjoyed a spectacular degree of growth. As a result an army of certified AML/CFT 
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practitioners, trained at expensive conferences in grand hotels which provide access to an 
ever more specialised hierarchy qualifications, has now begun add to an additional regulatory 
dimension in and around all the world’s formally constituted financial institutions.  
 
The consequences of all this activity are now quite clear. Not only are AML specialists highly 
sought after as everyone has hurried to ensure that their practices and procedures comply with 
FATF and FINCEN requirements, but a wide range of very respectable institutions have been 
fined for failing to implement the now-essential – but bureaucratically tiresome – know-your-
customer procedures. However the impact of the new and hurriedly constituted regulatory 
regime on those involved in hawala, which was of course explicitly identified as one of its 
principle targets, has been far more severe. To cite some examples, the al-barakat network – 
at that time the largest and most sophisticated of Somalia’s hawala systems – was closed 
down and all its available assets early in 2002; the US authorities insisted that it had played a 
role in financing al-Qaeda’s activities, although no concrete evidence of that allegation has 
been produced, and nor has it led to any formal charges being been brought before the courts. 
Likewise several of the UK-based hawaladars in whose cases I was instructed to prepare 
expert reports have been found guilty as charged, and are now serving lengthy terms of 
imprisonment, despite the absence of any concrete evidence that the funds in question were 
actually generated from the sale of heroin; indeed Customs and Excise never managed to 
identify, let alone arrest, any major heroin wholesalers during the course of a massive series 
of surveillance operations which preceded the hawaladars’ arrests. Last but not least World 
Link Exchange – one of the Dubai’s major Exchange Houses – was forced to shut down, 
although no legal proceedings have as yet been taken against it.  
 
Nevertheless these developments have undoubtedly had a substantial short-term impact on 
the global hawala system, and no-where more dramatically than on the flow of remittances 
from the UK to Pakistan. Following HM Customs and Excise decision to arrest several major 
hawaladars, which led, amongst other things, to some very substantial sums still in passage 
through pipeline being impounded by the authorities, the great majority of those sending 
money back to Pakistan promptly began to look for safer alternatives. One option was simply 
to turn to the formal sector, despite its substantially higher transmission costs. The other 
option was much more straightforward: to carry substantial sums in currency notes on visits 
home, not least because these could be exchanged for rupees at a substantial premium over 
the official rate as soon as they arrived in Pakistan.  
 
Nevertheless there are good reasons to expect that these effects will only be temporary. In the 
aftermath of al-Barakat’s closure, other smaller Somali networks promptly expanded to fill 
the resultant gap in the market. Hawala remains the very lifeblood of the Somali economy, 
just as Maimbo observed it to be in Afghanistan. Moreover whilst the crack-down on hawala 
certainly precipitated a sharp rise in the inflow of remittances through the formal sector into 
Pakistan. Figures compiled by the State Bank of Pakistan showed that the inflow grew by 
150% in fiscal 2001-02, and by a further 78% during the following year. However there are 
now indications that this effect turn out to be proved to be short-lived: a comparison between 
the July-December figures for 2003-4 with those of 2002-3 reveal that the inflow of 
remittances through formal channels dropped by 10% during this period. 
6.3 Survival and adjustment 
Once again this development should come as no surprise. If, as there is good reason to 
believe, one of the central functions of hawala and other similar forms of IVTS is to provide 
financial liquidity to the contemporary version of the Indian Ocean’s age-old patterns of 
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‘country trade’, and if its services in this sphere also enjoy a position of clear competitive 
advantage over those provided by the formally constituted banking sector, the prospect that 
the whole system would fade away in the face of a setback to one of its regional components 
was extremely unlikely. Hawala has survived far more serious storms in the past, and given 
that its strength has always lain in its inherent flexibility, a rapid adaptation to the constraints 
of a post-9/11 world was only to be expected. Indeed many aspects of those adjustments have 
proved to be remarkably easy.  
 
In a wonderful irony, hawaladars are in a much better position to conform to the KNC (know-
your-customer) regulations which have been laid down by FINCEN and FATF than are 
bureaucratically top-heavy rivals in the formal sector: they actually know their customers 
personally. Of course it is rather difficult to require one’s customers to produce a utility bill 
and a passport it they are subsistence farmers in a remote corner of the developing world, but 
such procedures are much more straightforward at the other end of the chain: if needs must 
UK-based hawaladars can always put the relevant documents through a photocopier, and 
build stacks of paper in some innocuous corner of their premises; or, more progressively, they 
can follow Dahabashiil Financial Services – one of the successors to al-Barakat now 
providing hawala services to Somalia – by hiring software engineers from Bangalore to 
construct a fully computerised internet-based customer records system; and if that is not 
enough, they can always follow the lead set by the UAE Exchange in Dubai. They have sited 
their computers in such a way that passers-by on the sidewalk can directly observe that their 
data-entry system is fully compliant with AML/CFT best practice.  
 
Most ironically of all, whilst all the Exchange Houses plastered their store fronts, websites 
and so forth with Western Union posters which further supplemented expensive advertising 
displays in airports and magazines world-wide, the leading formal sector money-transmission 
agencies appear to have reaped very few bangs for their bucks. Though Western Union has 
also set up shop alongside the Exchange Houses in the Dubai money market, my own 
observations suggested that while all the Hawaladars received a steady stream of customers, 
Western Union’s wares were almost entirely ignored. In straightforward commercial terms 
they are simply in no position to compete with their more organisationally-efficient rivals. 
Despite everything, the Exchange houses of Dubai are still very firmly in business. 
 
But just what is that business? And have post 9/11 regulatory requirements really led these 
leopards to change their spots? My own conclusion is that most hawaladars have indeed done 
just that. By making a few cosmetic adjustments they have indeed turned themselves into 
spotless leopards – or in other words much less visible panthers – such that they are able to 
continue in business with the key features of their everyday operations virtually untouched. 
But although there are now clear indications that hawaladars at all levels in the system have 
by now made very similar adjustments to local regulatory requirement, so enabling the 
system to survive what might otherwise have been a serious onslaught on its very existence, it 
is now becoming increasing clear that the new AML/CFT regime – just like so many of other 
ill-considered quick-fix measures generated by the “War on Terrorism” – also has several 
alarming downsides.  
 
First, the task of gathering the evidence needed to construct an analytical model of how the 
hawala system actually works has been rendered a great deal more challenging. Since there is 
a very real prospect that any information which hawaladars disclose to outsiders could be 
taken down as evidence to be used against them, system-operators at all levels have become 
even more reluctant to discuss their activities with outside investigators: they, too, apply their 
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own version of KYC regulations. Meanwhile the authorities appear to have scored just as 
serious an own-goal with respect to their nominal objectives of tracking down terrorists and 
drug-smugglers. Had an effort been made to work with hawaladars on a collaborative basis, 
rather than merely to criminalise them, it might well have proved possible to implement an 
audit trail through their informal networks in such a way as to lead them to such targets – 
always supposing that the targets which the authorities had in mind were there to find in the 
first place. However their preferred strategy of shooting first and asking questions afterwards 
has produced the contrary outcome. Whilst a few hapless hawaladars have indeed been 
served up as sacrificial victims to the war on terror, the authorities’ much publicised strategic 
objective of using hawala to track down and prosecute criminals appears to have produced 
few results of any significance. Whilst prosecuting messengers is undoubtedly an extremely 
effective way of producing instant headlines, the intelligence gain from such procedures is 
almost entirely negative.  
 
Indeed it is now becoming increasingly clear that authorities’ heavy-handed efforts to 
criminalise and hence suppress hawala have now begun to back-fire. Superficial progress has 
indeed been achieved: most retail hawaladars in Europe, North America and the Gulf have by 
now taken steps to ensure that their store-front operations conform to regulatory best practice; 
by contrast the system’s back-office procedures, most especially with regard to such issues as 
consolidation, settlement counter-flows and distribution remain as obscure as ever. It is not 
hard to see why. AML/CFT practitioners have displayed minimal interest in these complex 
matters, and as long as their central emphasis has been on KYC, they have made few if any 
efforts to gather the relevant information. Meanwhile hawaladars still have every reason to 
keep their heads firmly beneath the parapet, even if their business is wholly above board. In 
an arena in which hysteria has far more impact on formally received opinion than does 
rational discussion, it would be stupid to behave otherwise.  
 
Nevertheless lack of empirical evidence to support of their extravagant hypotheses appears to 
cause little visible alarm amongst the advocates AML/CFT, and it has certainly not weakened 
their global crusade against ‘underground banking’. Why, then is the campaign against 
informal procedures still being pursued with such vigour even though it has generated so little 
concrete (as opposed to a symbolic) progress towards identification and prosecution of 
terrorists and drug smugglers? Two complementary answers to this conundrum immediately 
present themselves.  
 
In the first place such a reaction suggests that to those for whom formal, bureaucratically 
grounded procedures are the ideological norm, informal and hence bureaucratically 
unregulated procedures are quite simply conceptually offensive – so much so that they 
conclude that the apparent untidiness of informal systems is bound to be a source of 
malfeasance. For them regulation is a necessary guarantee against disorder, and hence the 
potential for criminal activity, regardless of whether or not such disorder has emerged.  
 
However there are good grounds for believing that this ideological perspective is further 
reinforced by more practical concerns. In the global money transmission business – and most 
especially in the business of delivering migrant remittances from Euro-America to distant 
recipients in the developing world – the formal and informal sectors stand as toe to toe rivals. 
Not only is this market both large and rapidly growing, but operators in the informal sector 
occupy a position of very considerable competitive advantage as compared with their more 
bureaucratically constituted rivals. In these circumstances the likely consequences of the 
successful imposition of an additional regulatory burden on the informal sector are plain to 
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see. Those informal operators who were unable to cope with the regulatory burden would be 
forced out of business, whilst those who did achieve conformity with the new regime would 
necessarily be burdened by additional costs. Either option would produce the same result as 
far as the formal sector is concerned: a welcome reduction in competitive pressure. However 
it is also worth noting the prospect of an alternative scenario emerging. As internet 
communications become increasingly secure and as all aspects of the hawala operation 
become increasingly computerised, there is a very real prospect that hawaladars may be able 
to fully implement all aspects of the KYC regulations and continue to implement their 
otherwise established methods of consolidation and settlement: if so, they should have little 
difficulty in continuing to do business whilst still keeping their transaction costs to their 
historically low levels – with which the formal sector (at least as present constituted) is most 
unlikely to be able to compete.  
7 The challenge from below 
7.1 Migration and entrepreneurship 
Yet although the hawala system may consequently offer a real as opposed to a fictional 
challenge to the operating profits of the worlds major banking enterprises – albeit a fairly 
marginal scale – the whole institution is of very much greater significance from the 
perspective of economic development. From that perspective it emerges as a highly 
sophisticated financial operation which plays crucial but hitherto largely unconsidered role in 
delivering huge sums of development capital on a stable and non-debt-inducing basis straight 
into the pockets of some of the world’s poorest and most marginalised local communities. 
Viewed from below, priorities change dramatically. To that of the large section of the global 
population whose members live, work, and seek to advance their material assets in regions far 
beyond the bounds of the formal banking sector’s still tightly spatially limited operational 
frontier, transnational labour migration and the resulting reverse flows of capital assets open 
up entirely new vistas of wealth creation and economic development.  
 
Nor are those vistas dependent in any way on top-down generosity. They are not aid-
dependent; and provided the inflow of migrant remittances can be protected from the 
exploitative proclivities of the developing world’s kleptocratic elites the resulting asset flows 
at long last offer a real prospect whereby some of the most poverty-stricken sections of the 
worlds population being able to mount a serious challenge to the positions of marginalisation 
to which they have hitherto been assigned. Most significantly of all it offers them a prospect 
of doing so not humble recipients of half-hearted benevolence from elsewhere, but as self-
supporting entrepreneurs acting on their own terms. Hawala – I would suggest – is part and 
parcel of that whole inherently transgressive initiative.  
 
In these circumstances efforts to use the ideologically driven smoke and mirrors of 
AML/CFT to discredit the utility of self-constructed and self-regulating value transmission 
networks such as hawala can only have one consequence: it further disadvantages the 
inhabitants of Euro-America’s former colonial possessions by once again de-legitimising 
their efforts to help themselves. As ever lack of evidence is not a viable excuse for a failure to 
address that possibility. For those prepared think outside the box of their own pre-conceived 
assumptions, the basic principles around which hawala and parallel systems of IVTS operate 
are not hard to discern.  
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7.2 The art of hawala 
The essence of hawala, it is worth remembering, is not a one way processes of value 
transmission, but rather the exchange of debt,4 particularly in the context of long-distance 
trade. It follows that in the vocabulary of contemporary banking practice, hawala (and indeed 
many other forms of IVTS) are a means of implementing trans-local financial settlements. 
Moreover as all bankers know, consolidation is the route to commercial success, since the 
cost of implementing a very large transaction is rarely much greater than that of completing a 
single very small one. Hence the key to success in any forex business – and most especially 
one which is remittance-driven – is to bulk up funds deposited by a multiplicity of individuals 
into a small number of much larger tranches in order to take advantage of economies of scale 
in the settlement process. Even so getting to a position from which to take advantage of those 
economies is itself a costly business, given the way in which the formal banking sector 
routinely operates. The clerical effort required, and the paper-work generated in the course of 
implementing the processes of consolidation and de-consolidation which are a necessary 
prerequisite for the completion of commercially-efficient settlement processes is extremely 
expensive. That is precisely the reason why the formal sector charges for small scale inter-
currency and inter-jurisdictional value transfers rarely drop below 10%, while for transfers in 
the million dollar range drop to a tiny fraction of that figure.  
 
Against that background, the art of hawala is very easily explained: it is grounded in the 
implementation of exactly the same processes of consolidation and settlement as those which 
the formal banking system undertakes, but in which the security of each of the transactions 
which underpin the whole operation is not underpinned by elaborate and expensive processes 
of formal record-keeping, but rather through decentralised, informal and self-regulating 
networks of absolute trust. As a result record-keeping is reduced to the bare minimum 
required to ensure the accurate implementation of each of the deals which any given pair of 
hawaladars contract between themselves. Since this is a distributed system, it has no central 
registry: it is quite literally superfluous. In the context of this distributed system each 
hawaladar is in a position to contract a swap with any other hawaladar whom he trusts, and 
who likewise trusts him: gaining and maintaining a reputation for absolute trustworthiness is 
therefore an absolute prerequisite for participation in the system – and, of course, for its very 
reliability. Hence it is well understood that if any participant was to be so foolish to betray 
that trust, sanctions of the utmost severity would necessarily ensue.  
 
A further key feature of this distributed system is that hawaladars have no necessary 
obligation to do business with one another. To be sure kinsfolk frequently find it convenient 
to cooperate closely, especially when they operate in separate markets: if their interests are 
complementary the even deeper levels of mutual trust that arise from common kinship means 
that they can readily cope with exceptionally high levels of temporary financial exposure. But 
whilst all hawala deals generate some degree of financial exposure – since settlements 
invariably take some time to catch up with each other – hawaladars routinely compete 
fiercely with one another for each new business opportunity. Hence not only are margins 
regularly cut to the bone as hawaladars shop around the market in search of the best available 
deal, but each of the deals which they contract is free-standing. Completion of a deal today 
gives rise to no obligation to make a deal with same partner tomorrow if better terms can be 
found elsewhere.  
                                                 
4 This is the way in which the term hawala is understood in Arabic legal commentaries on the practice prepared 
well over a millennium ago. In concrete terms these commentaries are largely focussed on commercial practices 
in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea, whose hub then lay in Egypt (Ballard 2003: 4). 
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Hawaladars take the same parsimonious view with respect to record keeping: whilst they 
keep meticulous records of the details of each specific agreement they reach, details which 
are extraneous to its implementation are routinely discarded. Given the presence of a network 
of relationships of absolute trust through which to underpin security, distributed systems of 
this kind can clearly afford to be a great deal more ‘informal’ in their approach to business 
than more formally constituted Western-style banks, since they have no need to sustain the 
elaborate and expensive back-offices which are prerequisite to the maintenance of their 
bureaucratically grounded procedures. It is precisely because such informally constructed 
distributed systems can afford to stay so much leaner and meaner that hawala enjoys such a 
huge competitive advantage as compared with their formally constituted rivals.  
7.3 An illustration: hawala in action 
With this model of a distributed system in mind, let us now consider just how global hawala – 
as coordinated from the Exchange Houses in Dubai – actually works. As a starting point it is 
worth noting that the label which these businesses use to identify themselves is entirely apt: 
they are best understood not as banks but groups of market-making Forex brokerage houses. 
Within them a small number of dealers are constantly engaged in negotiating complex back-
to-back swaps in which they buy large tranches of Sterling, Euros, and Dihrams (or in other 
word hard currencies which can readily be converted into US dollars) from 
consolidating/retail hawaladars in Europe, North America and the Gulf, in exchange for the 
delivery of similarly sized tranche of Rupees, Taka, Afghanis, Rials and so forth; meanwhile 
they simultaneously construct deals with customers based in countries where those currencies 
circulate who are only to willing to buy US dollars at a premium rate in exchange for local 
soft currency out-payments. Having brokered such a mutually satisfactory settlement the deal 
is immediately implemented, again with a minimum level of back-office overheads, either by 
making – or by instructing their customers and/or hawala partners to make – the appropriate 
value transfers in the global medium of exchange (i.e. US dollars) through the SWIFT wire-
transfer system5. Nothing could be more straightforward. 
 
However as all bankers will be aware, the actual practice of settlement is in fact a great deal 
more complex that this grossly simplified model suggest, especially in the light of the 
specific characteristics of the market which the Dubai Exchange houses have emerged to 
serve. As we have seen migrant remittances give rise to a host of miniscule transactions, such 
that they have to be grossed up in huge processes of consolidation before they are rendered 
amenable for use in such settlement processes. By contrast most of the purchasers of those 
consolidated tranches of value in Karachi, Kabul, Mogadishu and so forth normally operate 
on a very much larger scale: many of them will have invoices to settle as a result of buying 
(for example) large scale shipments of grain from Thailand, computer components from 
China or Televisions from Indonesia. Whilst such businesses routinely expect their invoices 
to be settled in US dollars, they may well have their own reasons for preferring to have those 
funds delivered not to banks in their own home bases, but rather to accounts held in more 
free-wheeling centres such as Hong-Kong and Singapore, given that they are just as much 
                                                 
5  This analysis represents my own best efforts to make sense of the brokerage and settlement processes in which 
all the major Exchange Houses appear to specialise. Whilst the only way in which my hypothesis could be fully 
confirmed  would be in the context of an opportunity to conduct a comprehensive inspection of their financial 
records, it is worth emphasising that my interpretation is far from being completely hypothetical. It is wholly 
congruent with a substantial samples of transactions Exchange Houses’ accounts with major international banks. 
in both London and New York. 
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involved in hawala-style transactions as a means of organising the supply of components and 
raw materials for their manufacturing enterprises. 
 
The brokerage opportunities available in this complex market are undoubtedly legion, given 
that it stretches right round the ocean rim from Indonesia to South Africa. But if opportunities 
are large and rapidly growing, competition is nevertheless intense. Hence the prospect of 
making a killing is remote: not only are margins extremely tight, but the sanctions imposed 
on those imposed on those who break their obligations of absolute trust are extremely severe. 
But given the sheer volume of funds passing through this network, skilled and agile brokers 
have every prospect of making a decent living, given their capacity hugely to undercut the 
commissions charged by the formal banking sector, weighed down as it is by the dead-weight 
of its expensive bureaucratic procedures. 
7.4 Formal and informal approaches to system security 
All this raises some major philosophical issues. Whilst the hawala system’s position of 
substantial competitive advantage over formally constituted banks is grounded in the 
commercial efficiency of its processes of consolidation and settlement, its consequent lack of 
a central registry, let alone labyrinth of back-office records has provided proponents of more 
formal procedures with their central point of criticism and attack: how, they ask, can a 
‘system without records’ guarantee its integrity? And in the absence of such guarantees, does 
it not follow that such systems are wide open to criminal malfeasance, of which terrorists and 
drug smugglers are bound – sure as night follows day – to take maximum advantage?  
 
Given such a conceptual perspective, only one solution is possible: hawaladars must be 
required to sharpen up their procedures for ensuring system security. By what means? The 
answer is obvious: no matter how commercially admirable the hawaladars’ lean and mean 
procedures may be, they have an obligation – if only for security’s sake – to keep far more 
detailed records. Indeed if only hawaladars could reinvent themselves and adopt the same 
principles as those currently deployed within the formal sector (and thereby ceasing to be 
hawaladars) all would, of necessity, be well!  
 
However it is by no means clear that this ‘abolish hawala’ solution would necessarily bring 
about any great benefits. Even if we assume for the moment that ITVS networks are currently 
facilitating the laundering of huge quantities of dirty money – despite the absence of concrete 
evidence that this is indeed the case – there is little prospect of terrorists and drug-smugglers 
experiencing any great difficulty in identifying other ways of achieving their objectives. As a 
voluminous literature confirms [see, for example Baker (1999), Loretta (2003), Kleverman 
(2003), Jeffery (2003)], money-launderers have long since devised all manner of ways in 
which illegitimately acquired funds can be passes through a series of accounts in formally 
constituted banks, preferably those operating in off-shore jurisdictions where regulatory 
supervision is so light as to be virtually non-existent, before reaching its final resting place in 
well fire-proofed but wholly ‘legitimate’ numbered accounts in more convenient on-shore 
locations. Given the huge scope – let alone the widespread use – of these loopholes in the 
formal sector’s regulatory armour, efforts to insist that urgent steps should be taken to 
suppress IVTS on the grounds that it might provide a further channel through which money-
launderers could find it convenient to transmit their ill-gotten gains can only be described as 
very special pleading. 
 
Against this background it is worth remembering that like any other business enterprise, 
hawala owes its continued existence to the effectiveness and efficiency of the services which 
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it offers its clients. Moreover since the service it provides is nothing less than the 
transmission of value – or in other words the very foundation of its customers’ assets – its 
operators necessarily put a high premium on maintaining a reputation for absolute 
trustworthiness and integrity. But however much alarm this rapidly growing and ever more 
powerful distributed system may cause Western observers, not least because it lacks a central 
registry through which all the myriad transactions which take place under its aegis might be 
monitored, such structures are much more familiar, and much more deeply historically 
grounded, in the context of the Indian Ocean region in which it has emerged. From that 
perspective hawala is a classic example of an oriental system of self-regulation in which all 
participants constantly monitor each others’ reputation for trustworthiness. Regulation is 
locally not centrally organised, but implemented by participants themselves; and since 
everyone has a powerful interest in the maintenance of system-integrity, anyone known to be 
putting that condition significantly at risk can only expect to find themselves instantly frozen 
out of the business – and beyond that to be comprehensively excommunicated from the very 
community to which they belong. 
8 Conclusion 
There can be no dispute that IVTS networks – of which the specific examples which have 
been considered here are only a small component – is a boon to long-distance labour 
migrants, and most especially to those seeking to remit their savings to kinsfolk based in 
regions of the world which still lie far beyond the frontiers of the formal banking sector. No 
matter how much institutions in the formal sector may seek to reduce their transmission and 
delivery costs, there appears to be no prospect whatsoever of them being able to match the 
speed, convenience and efficiency with which well-organised IVTS networks such as hawala 
are currently able to implement delivery to recipients living in otherwise remote and 
inaccessible areas in the developing world. Indeed even when inaccessibility is not a serious 
issue – as when recipients are based in areas with immediate access to contemporary 
communications infrastructures – the same point very often still holds true. When it comes to 
the implementation of long-distance transnational value transfers, the speed and efficiency 
with which IVTS networks can process transactions, no matter how small in size, regularly 
puts them in a position of substantial competitive advantage as compared with their more 
bureaucratically ordered rivals in the formal sector. 
  
Like long-distance migration, IVTS is a phenomenon which is here to stay: indeed the two 
are best understood as two sides of the same coin. Just as the steadily falling cost of long-
distance travel has facilitated a rapid growth in long-distance labour migration, so the 
velocity of circulation of information and assets within migrants’ self-constructed 
transnational networks has received an even more dramatic boost as result of yet more 
improvements in the speed and cost of telecommunications. In an ever more wired world, 
attempts to impose any kind of centralised control on the circulation of debts and credits 
within migrants’ carefully constructed transnational such networks – for it is these which 
provide the foundations of virtually all forms of contemporary IVTS – are most unlikely to 
succeed.  
 
Entrepreneurial networks of this kind – which can now be observed bursting their way 
upwards and outwards from almost every corner of the non-European world – seem likely to 
emerge as some of the most significant engines of global socio-economic change as we move 
into the new century. As they do so all manner of long-standing patterns of inequality – and 
especially the institutional structures which have grown up to support well-entrenched 
patterns of hegemonic privilege – will find themselves being ever more comprehensively 
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eroded. The kaleidoscope of history never ceases to revolve. Hence whilst the emergence of 
England and then of the United States manufacturing may indeed have generated unparalleled 
levels of wealth for the inhabitants of Euro-America, it is now quite clear that Asia is rapidly 
regaining its historical previous position as the world’s premier manufacturing hub. How far 
the inhabitants of Euro-America will be able to continue to enjoy the standards of living 
which they have come to expect as large chunks of the region’s manufacturing base 
disappears eastwards is an open question. Meanwhile that very position of global privilege is 
now under threat just as much from within as from without, for a combination of consumer 
affluence and demographic implosion has also precipitated the very processes with which this 
paper is concerned: the mass influx of migrant workers prepared to fill the ever widening 
gaps which have begun to emerge at the lower end of the Euro-American labour market. 
Migration – no less than the shift in manufacturing activity back to its Asian roots – is having 
a far reaching impact on the structure of the global socio-economic order, whose future 
consequences we can currently only dimly perceive. What is quite clear, however, is that in 
the longue durée, these developments are quite unstoppable. 
 
As Bhagwati (2003) has recently argued, the entrepreneurial forces which underpin 
contemporary patterns of long-distance labour migration, and which are themselves very 
largely a product of the internal dynamics of innumerable transnational networks bursting 
upwards from below, have by now largely undermined all attempts by immigration 
authorities to place international border-crossing under effective regulatory control. If 
Bhagwati’s conclusions are anywhere near correct, it follows a fortiori that prospect that 
financial regulators might be any more successful in scrutinising – let alone regulating – the 
full extent of the circulation of all kinds of assets within these self-same networks on 
anything like a comprehensive basis are remote in the extreme.  
 
This should not, however, be read as a message of despair. Rather it forces us to open up 
some serious questions about the very purposes of such regulatory efforts, and in each case 
how those regulatory objectives – always supposing that they are actually worth the candle – 
can best be achieved. Such objectives potentially include 
• The protection of retail customers from hawladars’ malfeasance 
• The protection of expensively regulated banks from unwelcome competition  
• The protection of the numerical integrity of national and global economic data  
• The exclusion of the proceeds of criminal activity – and/or the financing of such 
activities – from the global financial system.  
 
By no means all of these objectives are of equal weight – or of equal seriousness. Given that 
retail customers appear to have few, if any, complaints about their hawaladars’ reliability it is 
by no means clear whether the pursuit of the first of these objectives – which appears to be 
the nominal objective of most current regulatory initiatives – can be expected to lead to any 
great progress towards the suppression of the last. Regulatory crack-downs may indeed 
provide a ready means of producing spectacular ‘results’, but these will be entirely nugatory 
if those cracked down upon turn out to be nothing more than scapegoats. In these 
circumstances a better informed – and hence much more tightly focussed – approach might 
well lead to more concrete (rather than symbolic) outcomes.  
 
 © Roger Ballard 2004 
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